Using a rich dataset of Colombian manufacturing establishments between 1995 and 2004, we illustrate potential scarring e¤ects of recessions operating through credit constraints. In contrast with the view that recessions are times of cleansing, we …nd that …nancially constrained businesses might be forced to exit the market during recessions even if they are highly productive. For instance, during recessions, an establishment with TFP at the lowest 10th percentile but not facing credit constraints has the same exit probability as a constrained plant with TFP at least as high as the 39th percentile. The gap is much smaller during expansions. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, it evaluates the role played by credit constraints in explaining …rm dynamics throughout the business cycle, a phenomenon the literature has dealt with mostly from a theoretical standpoint. Second, it sheds light on the implied long-run consequences of exits induced by lack of credit on e¢ ciency. Finally, it is the only study we know of providing direct evidence to judge the empirical merits of proposed micro foundations behind the long-run consequences of crises.
Introduction
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have bolstered interest in studying the potential long-run damage caused by recessions.
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The literature has dealt with long-run implications of recessions from two complementary perspectives: the analysis of aggregate trends and the analysis of …rm behavior. Focusing on the dynamics of unemployment, employment, and economic activity, studies within the former approach have found empirical evidence suggesting that recessions leave permanent or long-lived scars. Meanwhile, the micro perspective has focused on how short-run ‡uctuations a¤ect …rm dynamics, and mostly from a theoretical standpoint. While early contributions to this branch of the literature pointed at aggregate long-run gains from recessions, the apparent contradictions between this view and the macro evidence have motivated recent work on crisis-times …rm dynamics with potential negative aggregate consequences.
Our paper falls within the latter category of studies. We study the possibility that recessions shed some e¢ cient producers out of the market, speci…cally those constrained by scant access to capital markets. We approach this question by characterizing the empirical relationship between exit, credit constraints, productivity, and the business cycle, using a rich dataset on Colombian manufacturing establishments. The exit of highly productive businesses has negative implications for aggregate e¢ ciency. It may also explain long-lived e¤ects of recessions on aggregate productivity if …xed entry costs make re-entry unlikely. This is particularly relevant for Emerging Markets, where repeated exposure to …nancial crises may have led, on average, to lower aggregate productivity levels.
The fact that recessions bring long run costs to the economy has been established by a tradition of studies focusing on macro aggregates. Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987) made the case that short run ‡uctuations in the unemployment rate left long lived scars on the natural unemployment rate in Europe during the 80s. They suggested an insider-outsider story: once a worker loses HIS job, remaining employed workers raise their wage targets, preventing the unemployed from getting their jobs back. Ball (1997) elaborated on these ideas showing that NAIRU increases during the 1980s in Europe were mainly the consequence of tight monetary policies aimed at reducing in ‡ation. The implication was that, contrary to conventional wisdom, demand contractions alter natural unemployment rates. More recently, Ball and Hofstetter (2011) take a di¤erent look at hysteresis in unemployment by examining large changes in Latin American and Caribbean unemployment rates. They …nd that large increases in trend unemployment are always associated with deep recessions caused by demand contractions. Another set of macro-level studies has focused speci…cally on …nancial crises. Abiad et al. (2009) and the WEO group (2009) look at the medium term output dynamics following banking crises. They …nd that, on average, although output growth does return to the pre-crisis rate, the output level remains below the pre-crises trend in the medium run. Findings by Cerra and Saxena (2008) indicate that recoveries are weak when output contractions are associated with a …nancial crisis, leading to signi…cantly lower growth in the aftermath of the associated recession. These …ndings suggest that lack of access to …nancing may be one of the mechanisms preventing output recovery to its prior trend.
played by credit constraints in explaining …rm dynamics throughout the business cycle, and by shedding light on the implied long-run consequences on e¢ ciency. It is also the only study we know of providing micro evidence to judge the empirical merits of proposed micro foundations behind the long-run consequences of crises.
We …nd that credit-constrained but nevertheless high productivity units may be forced out of the market during recessions, while other less productive but unconstrained units may survive. In particular, exit probabilities for more constrained plants are signi…cantly higher (both in a statistical and an economic sense) vis-à-vis those for unconstrained plants, throughout the set of estimations outlined below. We estimate that, during downturns, the exit probability of an unconstrained establishment with TFP at the 10th percentile is matched by that of a constrained establishment with TFP ranging from the 39th to the 86th percentile, depending on the speci…cation. The survival premium for unconstrained businesses is much smaller during expansions. These …ndings indeed suggest potential scarring e¤ects of recessions stemming from credit market imperfections. In this sense, our results are a step toward reconciling the micro and macro evidence regarding the long-run consequences of recessions. Moreover, they also add to the evidence linking credit constraints and economic development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical background and describes the empirical model that we estimate. Section 3 describes the data. Sections 4 and 5 present our main results and some extensions, followed by concluding remarks in section 6.
Conceptual framework
A central issue in our paper is the possibility that pro…table productive units are forced out of the market by imperfect access to credit. This may be the case if, for instance, credit is necessary to …nance costs that need to be incurred before operation yields revenues, or to cover temporary losses when a …rm faces a bad shock of a temporary nature. This section sketches a simple extension of the Melitz (2003) model of …rm dynamics that delivers this prediction.
Our extension …rst introduces credit in a way that is inocuous for Melitz' results, and then introduces a …nancial friction from where our key predictions are derived. It is worth pointing that credit contracts in our model take very speci…c forms, that keep the model analytically tractable but are admitedly restrictive. Caggese and Cuñat (2011) present a di¤erent extension of the Melitz model that introduces …nancial frictions in a more ‡exible way. While their focus is on the impact of …nancial frictions for exports, their model does imply that, as we argue, …nancial frictions may push e¢ cient producers out of the market. Their model could thus also be used to motivate our focus on how credit constraints a¤ect the probability that a …rm exits the market. Our simpler model, in any case, does o¤er some value added beyond Caggesse and Cuñat's, as we show that credit constraints that are heterogeneous across …rms may imply that some unconstrained …rms may survive despite being less pro…table than some exiting constrained counterparts.
Melitz'model
We begin with the Melitz (2003) model of …rm dynamics. We …rst simply present the original model, keeping Melitz'original notation, for comparability and so that the reader can refer to that original paper for further details. We then add our extensions. We focus our exposition of the original model and our extensions on the exit decision, which is the central interest of the paper, but the appendix solves for the equilibrium with and without …nancial frictions.
The Melitz' environment is one with monopolisitic competition. In each period, there is a pool of potential entrants deciding whether to pay a …xed entry cost f e : After paying f e , an entering …rm receives a draw of productivity, , from a probability density g( ) with associated cumulative probability function G( ). The …rm uses this information to decide whether to go on to actually produce, or to rather exit the market.
A …rm uses labor to produce output, with a technology q( ) = (l f ) ; where f is a …xed cost of production. Per period pro…ts depend solely on the …rm's productivity level and, once the …rm chooses its optimal level of labor, they can be written as : ( ) = r( ) f , where (> 1) is the elasiticity of substitution between varieties in consumers'utility. So, the …rm chooses to not pay f , and thus exit the market, if the observed is such that ( ) < 0. Since is constant across periods for any given …rm, a …rm that decides to produce in its …rst period will not choose to exit in any future period.
Given these assumptions, a …rm decides to exit if its productivity falls below a cuto¤ level, < , where the cuto¤ is given by ( ) = 0. Since this is the implication of the model we focus on, we don't in this paper. Aggregate productivity, , is then calculated from the distribution of productivity truncated at .
Up to this point, we have simply reproduced a fraction of the Melitz model for the closed economy. We now proceed in two steps: we …rst modify the model to introduce credit in an explicit manner, but with no credit imperfections, and then introduce credit market imperfections. To be able to model credit in the model without having to move into a fully dinamic setting (Melitz' assumptions are such that each period can be analyzed separately) we will model credit in a very speci…c way that requires narrowing the range of values f e can take to f e < f . As stated above, Caggese and Cuñat's (2011) model shows that similar results can be derived under less restrictive assumptions.
Credit in Melitz'model
One question the model does not tackle is how are the upfront …xed costs of entering, and those of producing each period, paid for. Since we are interested in the e¤ects of restricted access to credit, we will introduce credit by assuming that, at the beginning of a …rm's life, all of these costs are paid for with credit.
This will have no e¤ect of the results under our initial assumption that credit markets are perfect.
In particular, suppose that potential entrants have no equity, so that entering …rms pay …xed costs of entry using credit extended by a bank (the "entry debt contract"). The entry debt contract stipulates that the …rm pays the bank back in the …rst period, after its revenue is realized. Moreover, in each period the per period …xed costs of production for those …rms that after entering decide to stay in the market are paid for before actually producing, with new credit ("per period debt contracts"). Per period debt contracts are paid back once revenue is realized. Revenue collateralizes debts, but we assume that there is a limited time horizon over which creditors are able to enforce these contracts: in any such contract they can only seize current revenue or revenue one period ahead. We further assume that, when revenues exceed what the …rm has to pay to the bank, those pro…ts are paid as dividends so that we don't need to keep track of increasing equity. To simplify notation, we will re-de…ne f e and f to be the …xed costs including the interest payments the …rm is supposed to make to the respective bank.
With these assumptions, we have that: 1. It is still the case that an entering …rm will decide to exit the market, without starting to produce, if its productivity is such that ( ) > 0, and stay producing otherwise.
2. The …rm that does not exit liquidates the entry debt contract in the …rst period of its life.
3. If r( ) > f e + f , then the …rm also fully pays the …rst period's per period debt contract upon receiving that period's revenues. Otherwise, it liquidates that contract in the second period, using revenue from that period. To produce that second-period revenue, it enters into a second period per period debt contract. After that period's revenue is realized, the outstanding debt from the …rst period is liquidated, and the remaining revenues are used to paid the second period debt and, if possible, to distribute pro…ts. If revenues cannot fully pay for the second period debt, then the outstanding amount is paid for with third-period revenues, and so on.
Notice that the basic results of the model, captured by equations (6) to (8), remain unaltered. It is still optimal for a …rm with r( ) > f (> f e ) to stay in the market, and under this condition all the other results hold. This is because we have assumed that credit markets are perfect, so that these …rms can access the loans they need to enter the market or operate.
Though we do not model banks explicitly, it is indeed optimal for banks to make the loans. For an entering …rm, the free entry condition implies that its expected pro…ts are enough to pay the bank back the agreed f e . After entry, only …rms that know their revenues will fully cover f request a per period debt contract. The interest rates the banks charge for these loans, which we take as exogenous here, cover the risks they incur: that an entering …rm turns out to not be pro…table and thus closes down without producing, or that a pro…table …rm is hit by an exogenous "death shock". So, in the aggregate banks do not incur loses. Since all loans can be paid for at most one period later, and banks are allowed to seize the revenues of …rms to which they have extended loans for up to two periods, they are assured they will recover the funds -except for the two contingencies mentioned above, that they cover against through interest rates.
Introducing …nancial frictions
We now introduce a …nancial friction that a¤ects a fraction of the …rms in the economy. In particular, for some …rms it will be the case that: 1. banks can only seize revenue in the current period, not in the period that follows, and 2. any given bank does not extend a new loan to a …rm that has not fully liquidated previous debt contracts with the bank. Whether a given …rm falls in this category is also revealed, together with the …rm's productivity level, once the entry cost is paid for. The probability that a …rm is revealed constrained is given by . For …rms that are revealed constrained, banks will only be willing to enter into a per period debt contract in the …rst period if the …rm's productivity is such that its revenues are enough to fully liquidate both the entry debt contract and the per period debt contract within the period. That is, if ( ) = r( ) f f e . The implication is that the survival productivity cuto¤ for constrained …rms, c is now given by ( c ) = f e . Unconstrained …rms, meanwhile, only exit if their per period pro…ts are negative (as in the baseline model). There is, then, a survival cuto¤ producivity de…ned by ( u ) = 0 for unconstrained …rms. The appendix shows that:
The central implication of the introduction of this type of …nancial friction is the coexistence of two di¤erent survival productivity cuto¤s, one for unconstrained …rms and a larger one for the constrained. Financially constrained …rms thus choose to exit the market with greater probability than …nancially unconstrained ones. Moreover, some …nancially constrained …rms exit the market despite being more productive that some unconstrained …rms that are able to survive.
This result is the focus of this paper.It implies that credit constrained …rms may be forced out of the market even if more productive that surviving unconstrained …rms. This is a source of ine¢ ciency, as it ceases to be the case that it is the least e¢ cient producers that exit. Our model cannot deal with the question of whether this asymmetry is starker during recessions. This is because, to keep the analysis static (as in Melitz'original formulation) we have assumed …rms face no shocks after they have entered and learned their initial levels of productivity and access to credit markets. However, negative shocks that reduce …rms'cash ‡ow (such as negative aggregate demand shocks) make it more likely that a …rm has to resort to credit to pay for its …xed costs of operation. In this sense, the problems arising from imperfect credit access that our model has pointed at should be more acute during recessions. In fact, Caggesse and Cuñat (2011) present a model of …rm dynamics under …nancial frictions that similarly relies on Melitz'model, but where …rms are subject to shocks between one period and the next. Their simulations indeed show that credit constraints only bind when …rms face negative shocks. Their model also delivers the prediction that …nancial frictions push otherwise pro…table …rms out of the market, though …nancial frictions in their framework a¤ect all …rms.
Empirical model
Our main purpose is to explore empirically how the probability of a plant exiting the market is a¤ected by credit constraints, and how this relationship is altered by the business cycle. We start from the canonical model without …nancial frictions, in which a plant exits the market if the present discounted value of its nets pro…ts falls below zero. The probability that a plant exits the market is then the probability that its expected gross pro…ts fall below …xed operating costs. Assuming that those …xed costs follow a normal distribution, we represent the probability that a plant exits by a Probit model. In particular, we follow Eslava et al. (2009) in modeling the decision to exit in a given period t as a function of the determinants of current and future pro…tability known by the plant at time t.
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Starting from these basic insights, we estimate a model where the probability of exiting the market at time t is a function of current total factor productivity (TFP), a measure of the size of the plant, sector and year dummies, and a measure of the extent to which the …rm is subject to credit constraints. The link between TFP and exit is crucial in aggregate terms: exit improves aggregate TFP if, as predicted by theory, it is the least productive units that exit the market. Given this and our central interest in the e¤ect of credit constraints, we focus not only on how those constraints a¤ect exit directly, but also on whether or not the e¤ect varies depending on how productive the plant is. This also responds to the basic motivation that we expect credit constraints to impact exit especially for technologically disadvantaged units, which may need credit to to acquire the technology necessary to stay pro…table.
Our basic empirical speci…cation can be written as:
where x jt takes a value of 1 if plant j exits in year t, and zero otherwise; d s are a set of three-digit sector dummies; d t are a set of year dummies; size and tf p are measures of plant characteristics that should a¤ect j's chances of surviving; constrained j is a measure of credit constraints facing plant j (de…ned later); and u jt is a normally-distributed error term.
A word is necessary on the inclusion of size as a control in this model. In the absence of a full set of measures of fundamental determinants of exit, size has been found to a¤ect the probability that an establishment exits the market: smaller plants are more likely to exit (e.g., Gibson and Harris (1996) , Bernard and Jensen (2007) and Baggs (2005)). One possible reason for this …nding is that size acts as a proxy for plant characteristics that theory suggests may a¤ect exit even in the absence of frictions; for instance, idiosyncratic demand shocks are one determinant of both a plant's scale and its chances of surviving. It is under this rationale that we include size as a control in our empirical model. However, it may also be the case that size is a proxy for the e¤ect of frictions that may a¤ect smaller units more directly. One of those frictions is precisely credit constraints: smaller productive units are expected to be more …nancially constrained than others (e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994 , use …rm size to proxy for capital market access). Thus, size may capture part of the e¤ects of being constrained that we are trying to measure. To that extent, our estimate of captures the e¤ect of being constrained beyond that of size, and may be a lower bound for the overall e¤ect of credit constraints on a …rm's chances of exiting the market. In some of the extensions of our model, we focus directly on size categories as proxies for credit constraints.
Note that we are also interested in evaluating the potentially di¤erential e¤ects of credit constraints in good vs. bad times (de…ned later), and for more and less productive establishments. Given the non-linear nature of model (2), the e¤ect of our measure of credit constraints on the probability that plant j exits depends on the phase of the cycle and on tf p, even without including explicit interaction terms between credit constraints and these elements of the model. More speci…cally, the marginal e¤ect of a measure of credit constraints on the probability that plant j exits in period t is:
where f is the normal density function. This marginal e¤ect clearly depends on the speci…c values at which the other covariates, including the time dummies and tf p, are evaluated. We obtain the marginal e¤ect of our measure for constraints during good times by setting the year dummies for bad years at zero, and the rest of the year dummies at the fraction of total good-times observations represented by each particular year. 8 We obtain the bad-times marginal e¤ect in an analogous manner. Similarly, we examine the e¤ect of credit constraints for productive units with di¤erent levels of tf p by evaluating tf p at di¤erent levels. Note that, with this approach, the di¤erence in the marginal e¤ect of credit constraints between good and bad times, and between more and less productive plants, comes from the density of at-risk plants at each phase of the cycle.
Alternatively, one can also consider the potentially asymmetric e¤ect of good vs. bad times more directly, by adding to the speci…cation interaction terms between the measure of credit constraints and the phase of the cycle. Interactions with tf p can also be considered to assess how the e¤ects of credit constraints depend on a plant's technological stance. Our second baseline model, summarized in equation (4), follows this approach. Here, we allow the e¤ect of credit constraints to vary directly with good and bad times, and with tf p. In contrast with equation (2), this variation would occur even with a …xed density of at-risk units.
Our model with direct changes in the e¤ect of credit constraints over the phase of the cycle can be written as follows:
Bad_t is a dummy with a value of 1 for observations that correspond to constrained …rms in bad years, d unc;Bad_t is a similar dummy for plants in unconstrained …rms during bad times, and d unc;Good_t is a dummy for plants in unconstrained …rms during good times. Our left out category is that of plants for constrained …rms during good times. 
Data
The data we use come from two separate sources. First, we use plant-level information on exit, inputs and outputs, constructed from the Annual Manufacturing Survey by Eslava et al. (2004 Eslava et al. ( , 2009 Eslava et al. ( , and 2010 . Eslava et al. (2004) , generate a consistent panel for 1982-1998. They have recently generated a version of the panel updated to 2004, which is the one we use. We provide below a brief description of these data (see Eslava et al, 2004 for details). A second source of information we use is the Superintendencia de Sociedades database (Supersociedades for short), which reports balance-sheet information for large …rms for the period 1995-2005.
The Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS) covers all manufacturing establishments with 10 or more employees. In the panel we use, the values of output and materials were de ‡ated using very rich plant-level data on prices.
10 The panel also reports consumption of energy in physical units, hour-adjusted employment, and a measure of the capital stock constructed through perpetual inventory methods. We use the above listed measures of physical quantities to construct measures of TFP as log residuals from a KLEM production function. In calculating TFP, we use factor elasticities previously estimated by the same authors through an instrumental variable approach (Eslava et al. 2004 ). Following Eslava et al. (2009) , we ‡ag a plant as exiting in year t if the plant reported positive production in year t but not in year t+1.
11
Since the measures of physical quantities we use have been calculated with plant level prices as de ‡ators, our measure of TFP should capture physical e¢ ciency, or TFPQ as it has been called lately in the literature (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Foster et al., 2008 ). In absence of plant level prices to de ‡ate output and inputs, the productivity residual (termed TFPR in absence of plant level de ‡ators) mixes e¢ ciency with idiosyncratic price di¤erences. A plant with high TFPR can be a low TFPQ but high price unit. Being able to properly measure TFPQ is important in our context because while the survival of high e¢ ciency plants is enhancing in terms of aggregate performance (arguably also in terms of welfare), the same is not necessarily true for the survival of high price plants.
As for the Supersociedades data, Supersociedades is the government o¢ ce in charge of overseeing corporations. The unit of observation is the …rm. The criteria for including a …rm in the database have changed over time. All …rms with assets or income over a certain level (20,000 or 30,000 monthly minimum wages, depending on the period) are included in the dataset, as are branches of multinationals. Up to 2006, smaller …rms were included if an inspected corporation owned more the 20% of the …rm. Firms that do not satisfy these criteria may also be included if the Superintendent decides so, and the number and characteristics of …rms included under this criterion varies substantially over time. As a result of the changing criteria for inclusion, some …rms appear intermittently, while others (the largest) are included every year.
We use …nancial information from the Supersociedades dataset to construct our baseline measures of credit constraints. Following Hsieh and Parker (2007) , we proxy for …nancial constraints with a dummy variable that separates …rms according to their coe¢ cients of correlation between a …rm's net operating profits (a proxy for cash ‡ows) and its purchases of …xed capital over the period for which we have Supersociedades'information. In constructing the coe¢ cients of correlation between investment and net pro…ts we use information on net pro…ts from Supersociedades, and information on purchases of …xed assets (machinery, equipment, and buildings) from AMS data, adding up all plants that belong to the same …rm. Our baseline measure of constraints is a dummy that takes the value of one for …rms for which this correlation coe¢ cient is in the upper third of the distribution, and zero for those …rms in the lowest two thirds (as in Hsieh and Parker, 2007) . All of the establishments owned by a given …rm are assigned the same value for this dummy. Notice that, while we study plant-level exit, we measure …rm-level constraints. The changing language we use below refers this contrast: while we discuss plant exit and plant performance, when discussing credit constraints we refer to the …rm, rather than the plant. may stop production without ceasing to exist legally. Since a unit that stops production but remains legally alive can resume production without having to re-pay part of the costs involved in entering, the costs associated with the type of exit we look at are a lower bound for the actual costs of exit, especially in the long run. On the other hand, ceasing production is a necessary step to actually closing a business. The type of exit we examine is thus likely highly correlated with actual plant closures. This is particularly true for the larger …rms, for which the …xed costs of keeping the plant open are likely very high.
The rationale behind our proxy for credit constraints is straightforward: a …rm that faces higher …nancial constraints is bound to rely more heavily on internal funding to …nance investments, and should thus show positive and relatively high correlation between investment and net pro…ts. The correlation could actually be negative in the absence of …nancing constraints, if businesses want to undertake investments precisely during bad times, when the opportunity costs of dedicating resources and e¤ort to improving technology are lower (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 1993; Aghion and Saint Paul, 1998) . Given these arguments, identifying …nancial constraints from the extent to which investment correlates with cash ‡ows is a standard practice. It is however, also one subject to large controversy, so we now discuss in detail the advantages and limitations of our approach.
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It is …rst important to highlight that our strategy separates …rms into more and less constrained, rather than indicating that some …rms are constrained and others are not.
13 Moreover, our measure of credit constraints is constant over time. Separating plants into more and less constrained, as opposed to using a continuous measure of the intensity of constraints, helps us mitigate concerns about endogeneity in our estimations. Credit constraints can be endogenous to the performance prospects of a …rm: if one of a …rm's establishments is at risk of closing, this may a¤ect the …rm's access to funding in …nancial markets. They can also be endogenous to the state of the economy, with banks being less wary of extending credit when the times are bad. However, our measure of constraints is not a¤ected by a either a …rm or the economy facing bad times, given that it does not vary over time. Moreover, marginal di¤erences in exit probability across plants may imply changes in our measure of constraints only for plants that are close to the threshold we use to divide the constrained from the unconstrained.
Another shortcoming of measuring credit constraints by the correlation between investment in cash ‡ows, as noted in Schiantarelli (1996) , is that current cash ‡ows (or in our case current net pro…ts) may be correlated with future pro…tability. To that extent, even unconstrained …rms may rationally respond to increases in cash ‡ows by undertaking additional investments. This has two implications for our results. First, it provides an additional reason to prefer the dichotomous constant measure that simply divides plants between more and less constrained, rather than trying to precisely measure the depth of constraints and their variations over time. By using a measure that is constant over time, we eliminate the possibility of a plant moving from our constrained group to our unconstrained group as a result of having observed a positive shock to pro…tability that the plant deemed permanent, but that may in fact be uncorrelated with …nancial constraints. Second, we have a noisy measure of constraints, potentially implying an attenuation bias in our estimation of the e¤ects of credit constraints. This latter implication must be kept in mind when interpreting our results.
Other approaches to measuring …nancial constraints have been suggested. One is to separate businesses according to size, where the underlying argument is that large …rms are unlikely to face constraints. We conduct some exercises based on this approach. In samples with large numbers of publicly traded companies, one could treat these as less constrained than the rest. This is not feasible in our case, however: less than 50 companies in the manufacturing sector were listed in the stock market during our sample period. Petersen and Rajan (1995) suggest the use of trade credit as a measure of credit constraints, by making use of trade credit the producer forgoes signi…cant discounts for early payment. Casual evidence suggests, however, early payment does not make an important di¤erence for Colombian manufacturers. Thus, in the Colombian case, producers generally make full use of the trade credit lines they are extended. In sum, while the investment-cash ‡ows correlation approach is far from perfect as a measure of credit constraints, it is also the best available alternative for our case. By using it to classify …rms into more and less-constrained over the whole period, rather than to measure the intensity of constraints precisely, we hope to mitigate some of the concerns raised in the literature.
Given the above description, our baseline estimations are restricted to plants in the AMS that belong to …rms for which there is information in the Supersociedades database. Our baseline dataset thus covers plants of relatively large manufacturing …rms for the period 1995-2004. 14 The period covers the deepest recession faced by the country since the 1930s, which occurred at the end of the 1990s. Despite the mentioned data restrictions, in this baseline scenario we have 8,497 …rm-year observations. Descriptive statistics for this baseline sample are presented in Table 1 , for the pooled sample (Panel A) and splitting it into observations from constrained and unconstrained …rms (Panels B and C). It is interesting to see that constrained …rms are on average smaller in size and less productive, and that they exhibit considerably larger exit rates: 2.3% vs. 1.6%. Notice also that less than 2% of the plants in this sample exit the market over the relevant period; the low rate of failure is related to the focus on large …rms. This focus is also re ‡ected in an average plant size of 85 Focusing on large establishments has shortcomings we discuss in further sections. It also has one advantage, however. Given our de…nition of exit, we may ‡ag as exiting a plant that has not left the market but has contracted beyond the 10-employees threshold imposed by the Annual Manufacturing Survey. This is an unlikely event for a large plant. However, later in the paper we explore extensions of our model that allow for the coverage of smaller units.
Finally, we split our sample into good and bad years in terms of economic activity. We use seven di¤erent criteria, from previous literature, to distinguish bad times (recessions or crises) from good times. We de…ne bad times as years for which at least four of the seven criteria coincide in ‡agging a recession. The seven criteria look at GDP, GDP growth, and the occurrence of banking crises or Sudden Stops. Details are explained in the appendix. Table 2 summarizes the results. We end up identifying one period of recession (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) , corresponding to the crisis period in Emerging Markets following the collapse of Russia.
5 Baseline results
Estimating equation (2)
Using the baseline dataset described above, we estimate model (2). Our focus is on how the exit probability depends on our credit constraint measure after controlling for TFP, size and time and sector e¤ects. As mentioned before, the credit measure is a dummy variable equal to one for …rms in the upper third of the investment-net pro…ts correlation distribution. Estimation results for this speci…cation are reported in Table 3 , Panel A.
As will be the case throughout the paper, we …nd that smaller and less productive plants face larger chances of exiting the market. This is consistent with previous …ndings in the literature (e.g., Eslava et al., 2009; Bernard and Jensen, 2007) . Our focus here, however, is on the role played by credit constraints, and their potentially asymmetric e¤ects in good vis-a-vis bad times. We obtain a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient for our credit constraint dummy: other things equal, establishments belonging to credit constrained …rms are more likely to exit.
Given the nonlinear nature of the model we are estimating, the actual e¤ect of credit constraints varies across observations, depending on plants' characteristics and aggregate shocks (see, for instance, the expression for the marginal e¤ect of constraints in equation (3)). We are particularly interested in the inter-relationships between credit constraints, phases of the economic cycle, and productivity. To assess these inter-relationships, we present our results in a variety of ways-which we will replicate throughout the paper for di¤erent speci…cations-. First, Panel B of Table 3 presents predicted exit rates, based on our estimation of equation 2, for constrained and unconstrained plants during di¤erent phases of the cycle. Furthermore, these exit rates are evaluated at di¤erent levels of plants'TFP: the mean, the 10th percentile, and the 90th percentile of the TFP distribution (we call the two latter "low" and "high" TFP, respectively). In turn, Panel C shows di¤erences between the exit rates presented in Panel B, and evaluates their statistical signi…cance. Figure 1 evaluates the e¤ects presented in Table 3 in a more general way, by looking at predicted exit rates over the full relevant range of TFP. Panel A of Figure 1 presents these exit rates for constrained and unconstrained plants during normal times, while Panel B di¤erentiates between good and bad times. 15 Panel C presents di¤erences in exit rates between constrained and unconstrained plants, separately for good times and for bad times-that is, the grey (black) line in panel C is the di¤erence between the solid and dotted grey (black) lines in panel B-. Meanwhile, Panel D presents exit hazard di¤erences between good and bad times, separately for constrained and unconstrained plants-the solid (dotted) line in panel D is the di¤erence between the black and grey solid (dotted) lines in panel B-.
A …rst approximation at our question points at sizeable e¤ects of constraints on …rm dynamics. The gain in the probability of survival from being unconstrained is close to 0.4% for the average TFP …rm during normal times (Panel A, Figure 1 ). This gain is large compared with the 1.8% exit rate for this sample; it is in fact equivalent to a 22 % increase in the probability of exit.
Panel A of Figure 1 further shows that the role of constraints is even more important for …rms with low productivity. For a …rm at the 10th percentile of the TFP productivity distribution, the gain from being unconstrained is 0.8%, compared to the 0.4% gain for the average TFP plant. The decreasing e¤ect of constrains along the TFP distribution suggests low chances that the highest productivity units are forced out of the market due to constraints. However, we show below that the di¤erential exit rates between the constrained and the unconstrained are su¢ ciently marked at crucial sections of the distribution to imply ine¢ cient exit. Furthermore, the …nding that the e¤ect of constraints decreases markedly with TFP is not constant across the di¤erent speci…cations and samples we evaluate below.
We are obviously also interested in understanding the role of the business cycle in this story (Panel B in Table 3 and Figure 1 ). We …nd that exit is more likely during recessions for plants of all productivity levels, supporting the view that downturns are times of increased restructuring. Moreover, we continue to …nd a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of belonging to a …rm in the upper third of the constraints distribution: …rms that we ‡ag as more constrained face a larger chance of exiting the market, at any level of TFP. Most interesting, this e¤ect is larger during bad times. In particular, moving from unconstrained to constrained status during bad times increases the probability of exiting the market by 0.6% for the average TFP plant (or a 40% rise in the probability of exit); the …gure drops to 0.3% during good times. 16 Di¤erences between constrained and unconstrained units decrease with increases in TFP, for both good and bad times (Panel C, Figure 1) . Similarly, the negative e¤ect of bad times on …rms'chances to survive diminishes as TFP goes up.
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These …ndings imply an aggregate ine¢ ciency coming from …nancial constraints: constrained …rms exit the market even when they are su¢ ciently productive to have survived in the absence of constraints. Put di¤erently: some …rms exit while being more productive than others that survive, solely because they face …nancial constraints. Though the positive e¤ect of …nancial constraints on exit decreases with the level of TFP in this estimation, we shall see below that more ‡exible speci…cations show di¤erences in this pattern over the cycle.
Estimating the model with interactions (Equation (4))
The model in Table 3 , although non-linear by nature given the use of a Probit speci…cation, ignores the possibility that the e¤ect of credit constraints depends on the phase of the economic cycle, even for a given density of at-risk plants.
In this subsection, we look at a more ‡exible model with explicit interactions (Equation (4)). The model includes interaction terms between TFP, the credit constraints dummy, and good and bad times'dummies. The results from this estimation are presented in Table 4 and Figure 2 (following the same formats and conventions of Table 3 and Figure 1 , respectively.)
Looking at normal times (Panel A, Figure 2 ) we continue to …nd that credit constraints increase the probability that a plant exits. We also …nd that this e¤ect varies considerably over the cycle and over the TFP distribution. For the average plant in terms of TFP, the increase in exit probability from being constrained is 0.9% in bad times and 0.2% in good times (Panel B, Table 4 ). Moreover, it is statistically signi…cant only in bad times. The ‡ip side of this relationship is that bad times hit constrained …rms much harder than unconstrained …rms. The di¤erence is starker than in the results from the less ‡exible speci…cation in Equation (2). For an average TFP …rm, moving from good to bad times increases the exit rate by 0.7% for unconstrained …rms. The …gure is twice as large for constrained …rms. The increased probability of exiting during recessions relative to good times is statistically signi…cant for both constrained and unconstrained …rms.
Compared with the model without interactions, the quantitative di¤erences are evident. For instance, note the large di¤erence between good and bad times in terms of the survival probability premium for unconstrained …rms (Panel C in Table 4 and Figure 2 ). For an average TFP plant, this premium is over four times larger in bad times compared to good times (0.9% vs. 0.2%). In contrast, in the model presented in Table 3 , the bad times premium only doubled that of good times. These results suggest that the direct interaction between credit constraints and the business cycle should not be ignored. Both the role of credit constraints and that of the business cycle are boosted in this less restrictive speci…cation.
To grasp the potential scarring e¤ects of recessions implied by these …ndings, we build the following counterfactual. We take the predicted exit probability of an unconstrained …rm with low TFP (10th percentile), and estimate what TFP level would leave the exit probability unaltered if the …rm were to move from unconstrained to constrained status. Results suggest that, during bad times, TFP would have to increase to that of the 39th percentile in order to leave the exit rate unchanged. The same statistic for good times is a move in TFP to the 17th percentile. In other words, during bad times, moving from unconstrained to constrained status has a quantitative e¤ect equivalent to reducing productivity from the 39th percentile to the 10th. We see this as strong evidence of scarring e¤ects of recessions operating through …nancial constraints.
The results reported so far on the e¤ects of credit constraints are a lower bound of their actual role, for two reasons. On the one hand, the regressions are controlling for the size of the …rms, a variable that has been often used to capture credit constraints. That is, some of the e¤ect we want to estimate is actually captured through the …rm size variable. On the other hand, we are focusing on a sample of large …rms, i.e., a sample with …rms that are all likely to have some degree of access to credit. We address concerns arising from these issues in the next section.
Expanding the Dataset
As discussed above, one problem with our measure of credit constraints is that it is based on balance-sheet information, available only for large …rms. As such, we are identifying the e¤ects we are interested in out of the limited variation in the degree of credit access across large …rms. Moreover, we are focusing on a set of establishments that are probably not the key target group when interested in the e¤ects of credit constraints. This is a problem that plagues the literature on …nancial constraints, since balance-sheet information is generally available only for large …rms, in some cases even only those …rms that are publicly listed.
Given the central interest on smaller establishments, we try to overcome this limitation in this section by bringing in smaller establishments present in the Annual Manufacturing Survey but not in the Supersociedades data. We overcome the di¢ culty of not having access to …nancial information for the …rms that own these establishments by using information on the size of the establishments. Our departing point, consistent with several papers in the literature (e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994) is that small units are more likely to be credit constrained. We thus add to our previous sample all establishments belonging to …rms that do not report to Supersociedades, and code small establishments as being constrained. It is important to highlight that these establishments are brought in while also keeping in all of the units present in our original sample; for the latter, we keep the initial de…nition of constraints. We de…ne "being small" as having 20 or less employees on average over the period for which we observe the establishment in the AMS. 18 The rationale for proceeding in this manner is to de…ne as constrained only establishments for which we are fairly sure their level of access to credit is much lower than that of plants owned by …rms that we code as unconstrained. Note, for instance, that the 20 employees mark is signi…cantly lower that the 25th percentile in terms of employment for the baseline sample (even lower when compared to the subsample of unconstrained plants in the baseline, see Table 1 ). For completeness, we also add …rms in the AMS with more than 20 employees that do not report to Supersociedades, but consider them to be unconstrained given that they surpass the 20 employee cut-o¤ point.
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Descriptive statistics of our variables of interest for this expanded sample are shown in Table 5 . Note that the time frame used here is the same as in the previous section. The exit rate for this expanded sample is above 7%, a much higher rate when compared to the less than 2% exit rate for the larger …rms in our baseline case. It is also worth pointing at the reduction in the average number of employees in this sample (approximately 29 employees), compared to our baseline (approximately 85 employees). Average TFP has also gone down, though only by 7 log points. Table 6 presents results of re-estimating equation (4)-our preferred speci…cation-for this expanded sample. 20 As before, Panel A reports regression results and Panel B selected predicted exit rates. While most results are qualitatively analogous to those discussed above, the role of credit constraints appears larger. For a plant with average TFP, moving from unconstrained to constrained status during bad times doubles the exit rate, from 4.2% to 8.6% (Panel B, Table  6 ). This absolute increase of 4.4 percentage points is much larger than the corresponding increase in the chances of exiting during good times: only 2 percentage points (Panel C of the same Table) . Moreover these survival premiums for unconstrained plants are much larger than those observed in Table 4 , and they are signi…cant at the 1% level. Interestingly, there is no signi…cant increase in the probability of exit of unconstrained plants between good and bad times, whereas there is a signi…cant increase (of 2.2 percentage points) in the probability of exit for constrained plants. It thus seems that unconstrained plants are better able to cope with shocks than constrained plants. Both the large survival premium for constrained plants and the very marked di¤erences between bad and good times are replicated at all levels of TFP (Panels C and D, Figure 3 .) 21 Our …ndings in this section imply even larger potential costs of …nancial constraints, in terms of aggregate e¢ ciency, than our …ndings in previous sections. Consider, for instance, the counterfactual of the previous section: for an unconstrained but low TFP (10th percentile) …rm, we estimate the exit hazard and then calculate the increase in TFP necessary to leave this hazard unaltered when switching to constrained status. The result is a move to the 86th percentile of TFP during bad times and to the 42nd percentile in good times. Even more worrisome in terms of aggregate e¢ ciency, however, is how the combined e¤ect of constraints and recessions varies over the distribution of TFP in this sample. While for the Supersociedades sample the bad times increase in a constrained plant's probability of exiting was much lower for high productivity plants than for low probability ones, the same is not the case for this sample with smaller plants. High productivity constrained plants face a similar increase in their chances of exiting during a recession than low productivity plants (Panel B, Table 6 ). This suggests that, contrary to the case of large …rms, small units have a harder time insuring against the e¤ects of credit constraints by becoming highly productive.
Despite these revealing results, a word of caution is warranted. Credit constraints are much more loosely measured in Table 6 than in our baseline exercises. Moreover, by adding size to the de…nition of constraints, the current extension partially mixes in an e¤ect that we were separating in our previous exercises. Adding these facts to the change in sample, it is clear that results in this section are not fully comparable to those in Tables 3 and 4 . It is still interesting to point out that, after adding the smaller and lower-TFP plants that we consider in this sample, we …nd increased potentially scarring e¤ects of recessions.
Concluding remarks
Financial frictions play a crucial role in explaining how …rms adjust to short term macroeconomic ‡uctuations. We …nd, for the case of Colombia, that potential scarring e¤ects of recessions are likely boosted by credit market imperfections. While we …nd throughout a family of empirical speci…cations that low productivity …rms are the most likely to exit the market, there are further di¤erences across …rm exit probabilities explained by their degree of access to …nancial markets. Particularly in bad times, constrained …rms exhibit a larger exit probability than unconstrained …rms with similar market fundamentals. With a reduced sample but an accurate measure of credit constraints (Table 4) , this di¤erence is nearly 0.9 percentage points for the average TFP plant, equivalent to a 60 percent increase in the exit rate (the exit rate for unconstrained …rms in bad times is 1.5%). In good times, this di¤erence is cut to 0.2 percent, or a 25% increase in the exit rate. Alternatively, in a speci…cation with a larger sample but incorporating a looser credit constraint de…nition, this di¤erence is 4.4 percentage points in bad times-or an increase of 105 percent in the exit rate relative to that of unconstrained …rms in bad times-and 2 percentage points in good times-or an increase of 46 percent in the exit rate.
Our results point at aggregate TFP losses from recessions. In particular, we show that during a recession, credit constrained units may be forced to leave the market despite being much more productive than some of their surviving but unconstrained counterparts. This has a negative impact on aggregate TFP. Moreover, the losses may translate into long-term scars to the extent that reentry is unlikely due to high entry costs. In this sense, the evidence we have presented helps reconcile aggregate trends suggesting long-run consequences of short-run ‡uctuations with theoretical predictions from the …rm dynamics literature emphasizing cleansing e¤ects of recessions. In particular, our …ndings point at a channel where the scarring e¤ects of recessions operate through …-nancial constraints that might leave permanent marks on aggregate TFP levels.
While our paper does not explore the determinants of credit constraints, it is likely that they are associated with …rm size, geographical location, and previous ties with the …nancial system. Previous studies have in fact pointed at the association between these …rm characteristics and lack of access to credit. Some of these associations suggest additional dynamic costs to the economy from the exit of …nancially credit constrained establishments. In particular, at an aggregate level, the persistence of low levels of …nancial penetration may be partly explained by the exit of young and small establishments. Exit prevents those establishments from reaching a scale that would allow them wider access to credit. It also truncates their chances of ever establishing a relationship with …nancial institutions that may prove self perpetuating, and destroys the value implicit in the still fragile relationships some of the exiting plants may have created with the …nancial system. Several policy implications emerge. First, countercyclical policies become more relevant in a world where long-run outcomes are dependent on the cycle. Second, based on our evidence, the role of …nancial frictions explaining this outcome is quite relevant. Thus, …nancial reform intended at deepening credit markets might help mitigate the long-run consequences of bad times. Moreover, reducing the frequency of recessionary periods, such as those provoked by international supply-side …nancial crises that invariably force more …rms into credit constraints should be bene…cial in terms of increasing average productivity levels. Thus, measures pointing to …nancial stability are also desirable. More research is needed to enhance our understanding of the consequences of credit constraints, particularly for smaller …rms for which …nancial information is not as readily available as it is for their larger counterparts.
APPENDIX

Model details
It is easy to show that , the average level of productivity, actually equals ( ). In stationary equilibrium, the M constant mass of entrants will equal the mass of …rms that exit, and free entry will guarantee that the average present discounted value of pro…ts, net of the entry cost, equals zero. It is assumed that, even if a …rm does not choose to exit, it is exogenously forced to leave the market with probability . The equilibrium is characterized by a combination of , , = ( ), and M .
In the version of the model without …nancial frictions, these four values are derived from the following four conditions : -Aggregate productivity:
-Free entry (FE), ensuring that the level of entry drives the expected value of entering to zero:
-Zero cuto¤ pro…ts (ZCP), derived from the fact that per period pro…ts for the cuto¤ …rm with will be zero:
where the …rst row uses the fact that = and the …rst order conditions of the …rm's pro…t maximization problem; the second row uses the fact that under monopolistic competition the ratio of revenues between two …rms (in this case …rms with and ) is a function of the respective ratio of productivities, with elasticity ( 1); and the last rwo uses the zero pro…t condition for the …rm with productivity -Aggregate equilibrium, ensuring that total revenue equals (exogenous) total factor payments L:
The last equal sign again makes use of the …rst order conditions, that ensure that = r f . Consider now the case with …nancial frictions. Since the production technology is not a¤ected by the …nancial friction, the pro…t function and the …rst order conditions of the …rm's pro…t maximization problem are una¤ected by the introduction of this friction. Pro…ts for a …rm with productivity can thus still be written as ( ) = r( ) f . It is, then, the case that: r ( u ) = f and r ( c ) = (f + f e ). Using this, and the fact that in the monopolisitic competition equilibrium
, we obtain that:
That is, not only u < c , but there is a monotonic relationship between the two cuto¤ levels.
With these elements at hand, we can now characterize how the system of four equilibrium equations (5) to (8) is a¤ected by the introduction of the …nancial friction:
-Aggregate productivity under …nancial frictions:
-ZCP f f :
where we have taken advantage of equation (1) to write , which depends on both u and c , solely as a function of u .
-Aggregate equilibrium:
Making use of these results, the following implications of the introduction of this …nancial friction can be derived:
1. The introduction of …nancial frictions makes expected per period pro…ts go up, as a result of the diminished competition implied by the exit of some pro…table but credit constrained units. This is proven in the Appendix.
2. The steady state mass of …rms goes down. This can be seen from equation (13) and the fact that increases. The implies a loss in welfare from the reduction in the number of varieties consumers can consume.
To see that expected pro…ts go up when …nancial frictions are introduced, we depict the FE and ZCP conditions in the ( u ; ) space, for both the case without …nancial frictions and that with …nancial frictions. The case without …nancial frictions corresponds to the original Melitz model (and is equivalent to the extended model under the assumption that = 0), and is represented by the two solid lines in Figure A . The fact that FE has an increasing slope while that of ZCP is decreasing is demonstrated in Melitz' paper. The intuition for the slope of FE is actually quite evident: higher u implies a reduced probability of survival after entry, so the expected pro…ts need to be higher to make the net value of entry gown back to zero.
The two dotted lines correspond to the case with …nancial frictions ( > 0). FE f f lies above FE because, for any value of u , c > u . As a result of the implied decrease in the probability of survival after entry, the level of that drives the net value of entry to zero is higher for any level of u . ZCP f f also lies above ZCP because, for any given level of u the level of is now higher (given more strict selection for the constrained …rms). It is thus clear that the equilibrium level of is higher in the presence of …nancial frictions, compared to the case in which these frictions are absent.(The overall e¤ect on the cuto¤ productivity level for unconstrained …rms cannot be determined from this …gure).
Good vs. bad times We consider seven criteria to separate good from bad times. We list those criteria below. We end up de…ning bad times as years that satisfy at least three of the seven criteria listed below.
a. Bad times are years with negative annual per capita GDP growth. b.
Bad times are years with negative annual GDP growth. c.
Trough to Peak strategy (e.g. Braun and Larrain): Calculate the cyclical component of GDP with an HP …lter. For this, we used GDP data going back at least to 1960 and up to 2008. Calculate de standard deviation of the cyclical component. Indentify troughs de…ned as cases when the cyclical component is more than one standard deviation below zero. Then go back in time until we …nd a peak, de…ned as a year when the cyclical component is larger than the two adjacent observations. The recession years (bad times) start one year after the peak and end at the trough.
d. Bad times are years with at least two consecutive quarters with negative GDP growth.
e. Bad times are Sudden Stop years. We use the de…nition by Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2008) . Systemic Sudden Stops are phases de…ned by the following conditions: (i) There is at least one observation where the year-onyear fall in capital ‡ows lies at least two standard deviations below its sample mean; (ii) A Sudden Stop starts the …rst time the annual change in capital ‡ows falls one standard deviation below the mean (iii) The Sudden Stop phase ends once the annual change in capital ‡ows exceeds one standard deviation below its sample mean.
f. Bad times are years with banking crises. The starting dates of baking crises are years when at least one of the following conditions holds: there are extensive depositor runs; the government takes emergency measures to protect the banking system, such as bank holidays or nationalization; the …scal cost of the bank rescue is at least 2 percent of GDP; non-performing loans reach at least 10 percent of bank assets. Following these de…nitions Dell'Ariccia Detragiache and Rajan, (2008) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 Years that satisfy at least four criteria 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Exit Probability (%) Exit Probability (%) 
